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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
FALL TERM 1991
WAYNE ESTELLE, Warden, 
Petitioner,
V.
MARK OWEN McGUIRE, 
Respondent.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
united states court of appeals
FOR THE NINTH dRCUTT
BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT 
OPINIONS BELOW
The unpublished opinion of the California Court of Appeal is at California v.
The opinion of the United States District Court denying is at J.A. 7-23. 
The opinion of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals is reported at McGuire v. Fstellp 902 
F.2d 749 (9th Cir. 1990). The order denying petition for rehearing en banc was reported at 
McGuire v, EstfJle, 919 F.2d 578 (9th Cir. 1990).
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit was entered 
May 4, 1990. The Respondent’s petition for rehearing was denied November 23, 1990. The 
petition for writ of certiorari was filed on December 17, 1990, and granted on February 25, 
1991. (J.A. 26). The jurisdiction of this Court rests upon 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
CONSTITUnONAL PROVISION AND STATUTES
This case involves the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution, and 28 
U.S.C. § 2254(a).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Preliminary Statement
This is a federal habeas corpus action. Respondent McGuire was convicted of second 
degree murder on March 19, 1982. (R.T. 789). His conviction was upheld on appeal to the 
First Appellate District on January 15, 1985. (J.A. 1-6). On March 21, 1985 the California 
Supreme Court denied respondent’s petition for a hearing. (J.A. 26). Respondent then 
applied to the United States District Court for the northern district of California for a writ of 
habeas corpus. The district court denied the petition on July 15, 1987. (J.A. 7, opinion at 
J.A. 8-23). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and granted the petition on May 4,
McGuire v. Estelle^ 902 F.2d 749 (9th Cir. 1990). The petition for rehearing en 
banc was denied November 23, 1990. McGuire v. Fjstelle. 919 F.2d 578 (9th Cir. 1990) 
(Kozinski, J. dissenting). This Court granted certiorari on February 25, 1991. (J.A. 26).
Facts
Mr. and Mrs. McGuire brought their daughter to the emergency room at 9:00 p.m. 
on July 7, 1981. (R.T. 87). The child was pronounced dead at 9:45 p.m. (R.T. 87). At
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the hospital, police questioned the McGuires about the circumstances surrounding the child’s 
death. (R.T. 206). Both Mr. and Mrs. McGuire were considered suspects in the child’s 
death. (R.T. 249). In response to the officer’s questions. Mr. McGuire suggested that the 
child had faUen off a couch and struck a walker, or perhaps an intruder to the home had
injured the child. (R.T. 209. 210). Subsequently, the State gave Mrs. McGuire immunity in
exchange for her testimony against Mr. McGuire. (R.T. 324).
At trial, Dr. Levine, who was on duty in the emergency room, testified that the child 
was bruised not breathing and was without vital signs. (R.T. 82-83). Dr. Herrmann, the 
coroner, testified that the child had died as a result of severe internal injuries. These injuries 
included a bisected liver, (R.T. 125). lacerated pancreas. (R.T. 126), contused lung, (R.T. 
127), and other abdominal injuries. (R.T. 128-129). Based on the extent of the injuries, Dr. 
Herrmann concluded that the injuries did not result from an accidental fall. (R.T. 141).
This conclusion was not contested. Dr. Herrmann was unaware of the rib fractures at the 
time he concluded the injuries were not accidentally inflicted. (R.T. 136).
At trial, the court admitted evidence of prior injuries to the child to show the decedent 
was a battered child, and therefore the injuries were not accidentally inflicted. (R.T. 73). 
Defense counsel objected at trial to the introduction of this evidence as prejudicial character 
evidence unnecessary because of other available evidence to show lack of accident. (R.T.
72). In asking that the evidence be admitted, the prosecutor told the judge "we do not
maintain that the battered child syndrome addresses itself to the identity of the perpetrator. " 
(R.T. 70).
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The court also admitted Dr. Levine's testimony that she noticed scarring of the 
rectum which indicated a tear through more than the mucous membrane of the area. (R.T. 
84). Dr. Levine stated that the injury was consistent with the forceful insertion of a foreign 
object. (R.T. 85). During Dr. Herrmann's testimony, he showed photographs of the ragged 
irregularities of the opening of the baby’s anus, and dated the injury at lease six weeks prior 
to death. (R.T. 136). X-rays taken at the time of autopsy showed several partially healed 
ribs. (R.T. 107).
Mrs. McGuire testified at trial under immunity. She was alone with the baby most of 
the day of July 7, 1981. (R.T. 350-351). The child was sick and crying. (R.T. 356). Mrs. 
McGuire testified several times that she had hit the child that day. (R.T. 342, 356, 364).
She said Mr. McGuire came home once during the day, then later in the evening. (R.T. 
351.) Mrs. McGuire also left the house for a short period to make a phone call. (R.T.
373.) Her testimony was inconsistent as to whether she knew the baby was alive when she 
left to make her phone call. (R.T. 339-340).
Mrs. McGuire was unable to be specific about when her husband came home, (R.T. 
356), how long after his return she left the house to make her call, (R.T. 401-402), and how 
long the phone call took. (R.T. 337). Mrs. McGuire testified that she was gone only long 
enough to cross the street and attempt to place a phone call, since the friend was not home. 
(R.T. 337, 394). A neighbor said that he saw Mrs. McGuire leave her house when he got 
out of the shower, and that he was dried and dressed before she came to his house for 
assistance with the child. (R.T. 548). This was the only evidence the State presented 
regarding who was with the child on the day in question.
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The prosecution offered other testimony to impeach Mrs. McGuire. Some neighbors
testified that they had seen Mr. and Mrs. McGuire have arguments which included physical
contact. (R.T. 463, 530). Another witnesses for the prosecution said on one occasion she
had seen Mr. McGuire pinch the child’s cheeks and lift her by the arm. (R.T. 469, 489).
The defense offered the testimony of an acquaintance of Mr. McGuire’s who stated he had
never seen Mr. McGuire mistreat his daughter. (R.T. 516).
Over objection of defense counsel, the court issued the following Jury instructions:
Evidence has been introduced for the purpose of showing that the 
Defendant committed acts similar to those constituting a crime other than that 
for which he is on trial. Such evidence, if believed, was not received, and 
may not be considered by you to prove that he is a person of bad character or 
that he has a disposition to commit crimes. Such evidence was received and 
may be considered by you only for the limited purpose of determining if it 
tends to show three things:
1. The impeachment of Daisy McGuire’s testimony that she had no cause to be 
afraid of the Defendant,
2. To establish the battered child syndrome, and
3. Also a clear connection between the other two offense and the one of which 
the Defendant is accused, so that it may be logically concluded that if the 
Defendant committed other offenses, he also committed the crime charged in 
this case. (R.T. 756-757).
The trial court intended that this instruction allow prior injuries admitted to establish the 
battered child syndrome to be used to connect the defendant to the child’s death. (R.T. 651).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court improperly allowed the jury to convict on the basis of character 
evidence. Mr. McGuire’s conviction rested on inflammatory evidence of prior injuries to the 
decedent. The ban on character evidence is deeply imbedded in American jurisprudence. 
Virtually every state, as well as the federal courts limit the use of character evidence. The
5
law views character evidence as highly prejudicial because it allows the jury to conclude a
person is guilty of some crime because he’s a bad person, and not on the presented facts of 
the case.
Allowing a conviction to rest on the circumstantial use of character evidence violates 
due process. Character evidence allows the jury to assume defendant’s guilt where the State 
has not shown guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Under the analysis of In re Winship. 397 
U.S. 358 (1970), allowing the jury to identify the defendant on the basis of character 
evidence violates fundamental fairness.
The prior injury evidence was extremely prejudicial because it encouraged the jury to 
draw unwarranted and unacceptable conclusions. The prior injuries were unconnected with 
the defendant. Even if admitted to establish the battered child syndrome, prior injury 
evidence is wholly non-probative for identity, and unnecessary to show accident. Yet the 
jury would judge defendant’s guilt on the basis of this evidence. The evidence’s usefulness 
in the trial was outweighed by its universally recognized prejudicial effect. The fundamental 
unfairness of admitting the evidence and allowing it to be used for a wholly improper 
purpose is of such a level that due process is violated.
The jury instruction released the State from the burden of showing Mr. McGuire’s 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The instruction allowed the assumption that Mr. McGuire 
was responsible for the prior injuries, and that the jury could conclude his guilt from those 
injuries. Since^the prior injuries and battered child syndrome can not constitutionally be used 
for identity, the instruction improperly relieved the State from its burden of proof.
Without strong curative instructions, prejudicial remarks at trial effect the
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fundamental fairness of the proceedings. The jury instructions given at Mr. McGuire’s trial 
increased the prejudicial nature of the evidence of decedent's prior injuries. The jury 
instructions were too ambiguous to be sufficiently cautionary in light of the highly suspect 
nature of this type of evidence. In order to be cautionary, the instructions should have 
identified to which evidence the court was referring. The court failed to do this. 
Additionally, the instructions allowed the evidence to go to identity, a purpose universally 
forbidden in evidence law.
Under the totality of the circumstances, the prior injury evidence was so prejudicial 
that Mr. McGuire’s due process rights were violated. The evidence was prejudicial by its 
nature when first introduced at trial. The court then instructed the jury to use the evidence 
for the very purpose that is prohibited. The state’s case was otherwise based on the highly 
conflicting testimony of several witnesses. The lack of overwhelming evidence makes it far 
more likely that the prior injury evidence prejudiced the proceedings
The introduction of evidence of decedent’s prior injuries in violation of Mr.
McGuire s due process rights is reversible error. It would be impossible for the state to 
show that the jury was not prejudiced by the faulty admission and faulty instructions 
regarding decedent’s prior injuries beyond a reasonable doubt.
ARGUMENT
I. MR. McGUIRE’S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS WERE DENIED WHEN THE TRIAL 
COURT ADMITTED INFLAMMATORY EVIDENCE OF THE VICTIM’S PRIOR 
INJURIES WHICH WERE NOT IN ANY WAY ASCRIBED TO THE 
DEFENDANT AND INSTRUCTED THE JURY TO USE THAT EVIDENC&TO 
CONVICT.
The effect of the evidence of decedent’s prior injuries was so egregiously prejudicial
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that Mr. McGuire was denied due process of law. The evidence presented to the jury 
disturbing facts which were never tied to Mr. McGuire. When evidence of prior injuries to 
a child is admitted to establish battered child syndrome, that evidence cannot be used to 
prove the identity of the assailant. Instead of issuing cautionary jury instructions which 
would diminish the prejudicial nature of the evidence, the trial judge issued confusing 
instructions which told the jury to use the evidence in determining Mr. McGuire’s guilt. 
Since the state’s case against Mr. McGuire was not overwhelming, the jury probably used 
prejudicial evidence of decedent’s prior injuries to determine the issue of guilt. Looking at 
the totality of the circumstances in the trial court proceedings, the effect of the evidence was 
so prejudicial as to deprive Mr. McGuire of due process.
A. Habeas corpus review is appropriate to determine if Mr. McGuire was
fpearcerated without due process of the law in violation of the Constitution.
When the constitutionality of a trial court’s proceedings is at issue, habeas corpus 
review in federal courts is always appropriate. The Supreme Court has authority to issue a 
writ of habeas corpus "on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State 
court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution." 23 U.S.C. § 
2254(a) (1990). Even if similar issues of law had been adjudicated in the state court, they 
are not binding on federal courts. Brown v. Allen. 334 U.S. 443, 506 (1952) (Frankfurter, 
J., concurring) (joined by four other justices).
The issue of Mr. McGuire’s due process rights is correctly before the Court. Habeas 
review in federal courts is proper when the entirety of the state court proceedings violate the 
defenant’s due process rights, even though evidentiary rulings are generally a matter of state 
law. Walker V, Fnglc, 703 F.2d 959, 962 (6th Cir. 1983); U.S. ex. rel. DiGiacomo v.
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Fran?gn> 680 F.2d 515, 517 (7th Cir. 1982). Whether the prejudicial nature of the trial 
court’s proceedings violated due process is a question of Constitutional law. Therefore, the 
federal courts may decide the case.
Thg pnor injury gvidcncc constituted character evidence which encourages the
lurv to convict where the facts do not show defendant’s guilt bevond a
reasonable douht.
The fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution mandates that state trial 
court proceedings be fundamentally fair to the defendant. The fourteenth amendment states, 
in pertinent part, no State shall ”... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law....” U.S. Const, amend. XTV, § 1. This Court has interpreted due 
process of law to require trial proceedings which are fundamentally fair. e.g.. Turney 
273 U.S. 510 (1927); Sheppard v. Maxwell. 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Spencer v. 
T£2^, 385 U.S. 554 (1967). Where the proceedings at trial are fundamentally unfair, the 
fourteenth amendment is offended.
Fundamental fairness is defined by long-standing views of justice. The Supreme 
Court has looked to the place of a rule in American jurisprudence to determine whether the 
due process clause requirement of fundamental fairness was satisfied. In re Winship.
397 U.S, 358 (1970). Where states virtually unanimously adhere to a rule, idi. at 362, where 
that rule has long been regarded as a safeguard against dubious and unjust conviction, ii. at 
362, where the rule reduces the risk of erroneous convictions, id* at 363, and where the rule 
is premised on sound reasons, id* at 363, fundamental fairness requires adherence to that 
rule. Id* at 364*. Additionally, the Court has affirmed the basic requirement that the 
government cannot adjudge a person guilty of a criminal offense without convincing the fact-
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finder of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. IsL at 364.
When deciding that the criminal standard of proof "beyond a reasonable doubt" is 
required by the due process clause, the Court in In re Winship considered the importance, 
rationale, acceptance, and practical value of the standard. Sk Winship. 397 U.S. at 363- 
364. Virtually unanimous adherence to a rule or procedure reflects a profound judgment 
about what constitutes fundamental fairness. Winship. 397 U.S. at 362 (quoting Duncan v. 
L<?uisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155 (1968)). States virtually unanimously adhere to this criminal 
standard of proof. Winship, 397 U.S. at 361. The Court has long viewed the beyond a 
reasonable doubt standard as a safeguard from dubious and unjust convictions. LL at 362. 
The standard reduces the risk of convictions resting on factual error. I<L. at 363. And the 
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is premised on sound reasons, protecting 
innocent people from wrongful conviction. IsL. at 363. From this analysis, the Court 
concluded that the due process clause mandates proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime 
with which a defendant is charged. IdL at 364.
In the present case, the trial court violated Mr. McGuire’s due process rights when it 
allowed his conviction to rest on evidence of decedent’s prior injuries. That evidence 
constituted highly prejudicial character evidence against Mr. McGuire. It was admitted in 
violation of sound policy. There is virtually universal adherence to rules against prior 
conduct evidence. Its value at trial to show identity, or any other exception to the character 
evidence bankas nil, since the injuries were not connected with Mr. McGuire. It’s value to 
show lack of accident was minimal at best. Yet the effect the evidence had on the jury was 
potentially powerful. Jury sentiment against the defendant based on prior bad acts is the
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exact type of effect the law attempts to avoid through the character evidence ban. To admit 
evidence which creates this inference, and to instruct the jury to use this inference to convict 
the defendant violates due process. If the law allows the jury to convict because of who a 
man is, and not what the facts show he has done, the State is released from the burden of 
showing beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty of every element of the crime 
charged. Due process does not allow this. Winship. 397 U.S. 358. Allowing the jury to 
convict Mr. McGuire on the basis of prejudicial character evidence violates due process.
Under the Winship analysis, conviction on the basis of character evidence violates due 
process. Virtually every state and federal evidentiary rules prohibit prior conduct as 
evidence of character. The character evidence rule avoids the risk of peril to the innocent. 
C.T. McCormick, Handbook of the Law of Evidence § 4,44 (E. Cleary ed. 2d ed. 1972). 
The rule is premised on the sound policy of avoiding undue prejudice and confusion. J.H. 
Wigmore, Pocket Code of the Rules of Evidence § 218 (1910). The character evidence rule 
is a safeguard against conviction where the state has not shown beyond a reasonable doubt 
defendant committed the crime. Following the Winship analysis, to allow a jury to convict 
on an inference of bad character is constitutionally prohibited.
Character evidence is highly suspect in virtually every jurisdiction. State and federal 
statutes generally prohibit the use of prior conduct to show that a defendant has bad character 
or criminal propensity. SfiS, Fed. R. Evid. 404 (West 1991); Ark. Stat. Ann.
16-41-404 (1991); Cal. Evid. Code § 1101 (West 1991); Fla. Stat. § 90.404 (1990); Ga. 
Code Ann. § 24-2-2 (Michie 1991); Haw. R. Evid. 404 (1990); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60447 
(1990); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 422A.0404 (Michie 1991); La. Evid. Code Ann. art. 404
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(West 1990); Minn. Stat. § 634.20 (1990); Mont. Code Ann. § 26-10-IV-404 (1990); Neb. 
Rev. Stat. § 27-404 (1989); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 48.045 (Michie 1989); N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 8C-4-404 (1990); Ohio R. Evid. 404 (Baldwin 1991); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 19-12-4 
(1991); Wis. Stat. § 904.04 (1989).
The ban on character ^dence protects against erroneous conviction. The principle
behind the character evidence ban arises “from the reality of the risk that any other rule
would result in convictions based on what a man is, rather than on what he actually did on
the occasion in question." McCormick, supra S 4.44. To allow character evidence risks
conviction where the State has not proven its case.
The prohibition against circumstantial use of character avoids undue confusion and
prejudice. The law views character evidence suspiciously because it is highly prejudicial to
the defendant. Wigmore, supra § 218. Wigmore, in his treatise on evidence law, states,
particular instances of misconduct, even though they would be relevant to 
show the type of character involved, are inadmissible, for that purpose and 
virtue of the principle of preventing Undue Prejudice and... excessive 
Confusion of the Issues.... [T]he chief reason for this Rule is the risk of 
undue prejudice, i.e. that the jury, instead of determining the accused’s guilt 
or innocence of the present charge solely on the evidence of the deed itself, 
will bring in a verdict of guilty because the accused has at any rate done other 
bad deeds and therefore will not suffer unjustly be the verdict.
Idi Sound policy backs the character evidence rule.
When a jury is permitted to convict on the basis of an inference of bad character, the
State is impermissibly released from the burden of showing beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendantTs guilty of every element of the crime charged. The prosecution in a crtminal
case must show beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed every act necessary
to constitute the crime charged. Winship. 397 U.S. at 363 (quoting Davis v. U.S.. 160 U.S.
12
469, 484, 493 (1895)). Character evidence allows the jury to assume either that the 
defendant has criminal propensity, and therefore is guilty of the crime charged, McCormick, 
SUpQ § 4.44, or that the defendant has done acts in the past which deserve punishment, 
regardless of his commission of the crime charged, Wigmore, supra § 218. Neither 
conclusion is consistent with fact finding beyond a reasonable doubt. To permit conviction 
on the basis of character evidence reduces the prosecution’s standard of proof and violates 
Winship.
Like proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the rejection of the circumstantial use of 
character evidence is constitutionally required. Under the Winship analysis, the character 
evidence ban, like the criminal standard of proof, is deeply rooted in American 
jurisprudence. Virtually all jurisdictions adhere to the rule. The ban protects against 
erroneous conviction. The ban is founded on sound policy reasons. This conclusion is 
supported by the Advisory Committee notes following Federal Rule 404 which state, "the 
criminal rule (rejecting the circumstantial use of character evidence) is so deeply imbedded in 
our jurisprudence as to assume almost constitutional proportions and to override doubts of 
the basic relevancy of the evidence." Fed. R. Evid. 404 (Advisory committee notes) (West 
1991). Without the rejection of character evidence, the jury may convict on a criminal 
burden of proof less than beyond a reasonable doubt, in violation of due process.
Mr. McGuire’s conviction rested on prejudicial character evidence. The testimony 
regarding prior injuries was extremely prejudicial character evidence against Mr. McGuire. 
The anal scarring indicated that a foreign object was forcefully inserted in the baby’s rectum. 
(R.T. 85). Additionally, the baby’s ribs had been broken. (R.T. 107). The doctors showed
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postmortem photographs of the child’s tom rectum. (R.T. 136). The State did not show that 
the injuries were caused by Mr. McGuire, But when evidence of prior conduct is admitted 
during a defendant’s trial, it is highly likely that the jury will consider the defendant 
differently in light of that evidence. When introduced during Mr. McGuire’s trial, the 
evidence was very inflammatory. The jury would likely use this evidence in judging Mr. 
McGuire.
The character evidence against Mr. McGuire allowed the jury to convict in violation
of deeply imbedded legal views of fundamental fairness. Conviction on the basis of an
inference of bad character is fundamentally unfair. The trial court admitted highly
prejudicial evidence of prior bad conduct which could be used as character evidence against
Mr. McGuire. The State must show beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. McGuire beat the
child on the day she died. When the trial court allows unconnected prior injuries to show
that Mr. McGuire is guilty of the crime, the State is relieved from both connecting those
prior injuries to the defendant, and from connecting the defendant to the crime charged. The
prior injury evidence created a risk that the jury would convict on an inference of bad
character. The trial court instructed the jury that this would be a proper conclusion to draw.
If the conviction is based on this inference of bad character from the prior injury evidence,
the State has not been held to a standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. This is a
violation of Mr. McGuire’s due process rights.
As a matter of fundamental fairness, the prior injury evidence was not__
probative of identity and should not have been admitted because it was
extremely prejudicial.
During Mr. McGuire’s trial, the court admitted doctors* testimony that the victim had
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anal scarring caused by the forceful insertion of a foreign object into the anus. (R.T. 85). 
X-rays also showed that the victim had previously suffered several broken ribs. (R.T. 107). 
Dr. Herrmann showed photographs of the child's anus to the jury during his testimony.
(R.T. 136). These prior injuries were not associated with the defendant in any way. (R.T. 
70). The judge instructed the jury to use these injuries to connect the defendant to the 
child’s death. (R.T. 651, 756-757).
As a matter of fundamental fairness, the prior injury evidence should not have been 
admitted. The evidence constituted prejudicial evidence from which the jury could draw 
unwarranted assumptions about the defendant’s character. The evidence was not probative of 
the identity of the assailant because the injuries were never connected to defendant. Even if 
used to establish the battered child syndrome, the evidence is not probative to identity. The 
admission is not justifiable for any exception to the character evidence ban, because without 
connecting Mr. McGuire to the injuries, the evidence is not probative of his intent, motive, 
plan, etc. The evidence was so prejudicial that even where minimally probative on the issue 
of accident, the evidence should have been excluded.
These prior injuries are irrelevant on the issue of the identity of the victim’s assailant. 
Doctors testified that the victim had suffered broken ribs and anal trauma several weeks prior 
to her death. (R.T. 84-85, 107, 136). The prosecution made no claim that the prior injuries 
were connected with Mr. McGuire in any way. (R.T. 70). The court admitted the injuries 
only to establish the battered child syndrome. (R.T. 73). The battered child syndrome 
(BCS) is used only to show lack of accident. CL People v. Ewing. 72 Cal. App. 3d 714,
140 Cal. Rptr. 299 (1977) (medical diagnosis of BCS admissible to show repeated, serious
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injuries over a span of time and of such type and frequency as to preclude an inference of 
accident); £a?Ble v. Jagkwn, 18 Cal. App. 3d 504, 95 Cal. Rptr. 919 (1971) (doctor’s 
testimony that child suffered from BCS admitted to show injuries were inflicted by other than 
accidental means); Cohoon v. U.S.. 387 A.2d 1098 (D.C. Ct. App. 1978) (expert opinion 
that injuries could not have been accidentally inflicted admissible); Commonwealth v. 
Poydfgau, 362 Mass. 664, 285 N.E.2d 915 (1972) (in manslaughter trial, medical testimony 
that child had received blows to the head, injuries consistent with a kick, held admissible); 
Statg V, Loss, 295 Minn. 271, 204 N.W.2d 404 (1973) (testimony that child’s death was not 
accidental part of a "complete chain" of circumstances showing defendant’s guilt); State v. 
Muni2» 150 N.J. Super. 436, 375 A.2d 1234 (1977) (expert opinion that rib fractures could 
not have resulted from hugging or a fall admissible); People v. Henson. 33 N.Y.2d 63, 304 
N.E.2d 358, 349 N.Y.S.2d 657 (1973) (BCS admissible to show lack of accident); State v. 
WilketSOai 295 N.C. 559, 247 S.E.2d 905 (1978) (expert opinion that child died due to BCS 
properly admitted, especially since doctor had not testified that BCS was caused by any 
particular person or class of persons); State v. Fredell. 17 N.C. App. 205, 193 S.E.2d 587 
(1972) (expert permitted to testify that child suffered from injuries which could not have been 
caused by a fail from a bed); Martin v. State. 547 P.2d 396 (Okla. Crim. App. 1976) 
(pathologist’s testimony that death was result of a blow to the head admissible); State v.
Best, 89 S.D. 227, 232 N.W.2d 447 (1975) (admission of expert statement that fracture was 
unlikely in the absence of "child abuse" not an abuse of discretion, although referencc-Should 
have been to "deliberate force"). Battered child syndrome alone is wholly non-probative of 
the identity of the batterer.
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The State's assertion that battered child syndrome may be used to infer identity is 
unprecedented. Battered child syndrome is a medical diagnosis that a child's injuries were 
inflicted by other than accidental means. Sas, Jackson. 18 Cal. App. 3d 504. None of 
the cases in which establishing battered child syndrome was part of State's case used the 
diagnosis for identity. In Wilkerson. the North Carolina Supreme Court, in upholding 
defendant’s conviction, especially noted that the expert witness had not implied that battered 
child syndrome is caused by any particular person or class of people. Wilkerson. 295 N.C. 
at 570.
Even where the battered child syndrome has been liberally used, courts have not gone 
so for as to say battered child syndrome alone is probative for identity. In Loss, the court 
held that battered child syndrome, together with the reasonable inference of a battering 
parent based both on medical testimony and circumstantial evidence was sufficient to convict 
defendant. Slfltg V| L^SSi 295 Minn. 271 (1973). This interpretation of the medical evidence 
is markedly more liberal than that of the other battered child cases cited above. However, 
is less far-reaching than the present case. Here, the State argues testimony regarding 
battered child syndrome alone, in the absence of any evidence of battering parent syndrome, 
is sufficient to convict the father.
Evidence of battered child syndrome is not probative for identity, and should not have 
been admitted for identity. A universal rule is that evidence is inadmissible for a proposition 
which it does not tend to prove. E^, Fed. R. Evid. 402 (West 1991); Cal. Evid. Code 
§ 350 (West 1991); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 624-45 (1990); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1 (1990); Ohio 
R. Evid. 403 (Baldwin 1991); Or. Rev. Stat. § 40.155 (1989); S.D. Codified Uws Ann.
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§ 19-12-2 (1991); J.H. Wigmore, Code of the Rules of Evidence in Trials at Law 16 (3d ed. 
1942). To use the prior injuries for identity contravenes the most basic premise of evidence 
law, that only evidence which tends to show some fact can be used to show that fact.
The highly prejudicial nature of the prior injuries evidence warrants its exclusion in 
light of its minimal value in establishing that the victim’s injuries were not the result of 
accident. The State offered evidence that the victim had scarring of the anus and previously 
broken ribs to support the claim that the injuries which caused death were not accidentally 
inflicted. (R.T. 73). However, the State had substantial evidence that the injuries which 
caused death v/ere not accidentally inflicted without resort to the evidence of prior injuries. 
The child’s liver was tom in two. (R.T. 125). Her pancreas and lung were crushed. (R.T. 
126-7). Dr. Herrmann testified that the injuries could not have been self-inflicted, and could 
not have resulted from a fall, even of 16 feet. (R.T. 141). In fact, the experts’ conclusion 
that the victim’s injuries were not accidentally inflicted was made without knowledge of the 
broken ribs. (R.T. 92, 136) Additional testimony on anal scarring and broken ribs to 
establish that these injuries were not accidental was unnecessary at best. When the trial court 
admitted the prior injury evidence, the jury could have unfairly used it to convict Mr. 
McGuire on an inference of bad character.
!>• The jury instructions violated due process bv altering the State’s burden of 
proof.
The instructions at Mr. McGuire’s trial shifted the burden of proof in violation of Mr. 
McGuire’s due process rights. The prior injuries can not be used to show identity. The trial 
court gave jury instructions which a reasonable juror would have interpreted as allowing an 
inference to be drawn from the prior injuries. Allowing this inference releases the
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prosecution from proving every element of its case beyond a reasonable doubt. This is 
unconstitutional under In re Winship. 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
A jury instruction is unconstitutional if it alters the prosecution’s burden of proof. 
Saodstrom V. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 524 (1978). If the jury instruction creates a burden 
shifting presumption, this violates due process since it allows the defendant’s guilt to be 
found without the prosecution meeting the burden of proving every element of the crime 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Sandstrom. 442 U.S. at 520 (quoting Winship. 397 U.S. at 
364). In determining whether the instruction allows an impermissible presumption, the Court 
considers how a reasonable juror would interpret the instructions. Sandstrom. 442 U.S. at 
514.
A reasonable juror would interpret the jury instructions given at Mr. McGuire’s trial 
as requiring the jury to use the prior injury evidence to determine the identity of the 
perpetrator. The trial judge stated this was his intent in giving the instruction. (R.T. 651). 
The instructions refer to evidence of "acts similar to those constituting a crime other than 
that for which he is on trial." (R.T. 756) No other evidence was admitted at trial which 
would constitute a crime. While evidence was introduced that Mr. McGuire had pinched his 
daughters cheeks and lifted her by the arm, (R.T. 469, 489), these actions do not constitute a 
crime. From these instructions a reasonable juror would have concluded that the instructions 
in question refer to the prior injury evidence.
Where the instruction directs the jury to presume an element of the offense upon 
proof of other elements of the offense, the instructions are unconstitutional. Francis v.
Fran klip, 471 U.S. 307, 316 (1985). In Franklin, the trial court instructed the jury to
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presume defendant’s intent to kill from the fact he killed. IjL at 311. This Court held that 
the instruction violated the due process clause because it released the prosecution from 
proving intent beyond a reasonable doubt. IjL. at 325.
The jury instructions given at Mr. McGuire’s trial are analogous to those in Franklit^. 
In the present case, the trial court instructed the jury that the prior injury evidence was 
introduced "for the purpose of showing the Defendant committed acts similar to those 
constituting a crime other than that for which he is on trial." (R.T. 756). The court then 
instructed the jury to determine whether there was a clear connection between the offenses, 
so that it may be logically concluded that if the Defendant committed the other offenses, he 
also committed the crime charged in this case." (R.T. 757). This instruction allows a 
reasonable juror to assume that Mr. McGuire was connected to the prior injuries when the 
evidence was admitted only to show absence of accident. From this unwarranted assumption, 
the trial court instructed the jury it could conclude Mr. McGuire was guilty of the crime
charged. As in Fr&nklin, the instruction released the prosecution from proving identity 
beyond a reasonable doubt.
Even if a reasonable juror would interpret the instruction as a permissive inference, 
due process is still violated. The Court in Franklin stated, "a permissive inference violates 
the Due Process Clause only if the suggested conclusion is not one that reason and common 
sense justify in light of the proven facts before the jury." Franklin, 471 U.S. at 314-315 
(dicta) (citing jllster Countv Court v. 442 U.S. 140, 157-163 (1979)). No infer^ce 
that Mr. McGuire is guilty can be fairly drawn from evidence of the battered child 
syndrome. The inference is not justified by reason or law, and therefore violates due
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process.
The jury instructions unconstitutionally linking Mr. McGuire to the decedent’s prior 
injuries likely affected the jury’s verdict of murder as opposed to manslaughter. In returning 
a verdict of murder, the jury would have to believe that the decedent was killed with malice 
aforethought. (R.T. 761). Since the jury was given instructions improperly linking 
Mr. McGuire to the decedent’s prior injuries, the jury could to infer that the act was 
malicious since he had committed similar acts in the past. Such an inference is totally 
unsupported by the evidence but encouraged by the erroneous jury instructions.
The jury instruction altered the State’s burden of proof in violation of the due process 
clause. The instruction allowed the jury to assume that Mr. McGuire was connected with the 
prior injuries, and from this to conclude Mr. McGuire’s guilt. As in Franklin, the 
instruction allowed the jury to presume from proof of lack of accident, proof of identity. 
Therefore, the prosecution was not required to show identity beyond a reasonable doubt.
E- The, jury instructions were_not properly cautionary and did not remedy the due
process error.
In the present case, the trial court did not remedy prejudice to the defendant with 
proper cautionary instruction. The court admitted prejudicial character evidence which 
would allow an unconstitutional conviction. When prejudicial evidence is admitted, the court 
must issue cautionary instructions to protect against its misuse. The jury received ambiguous 
instructions. Either the court instructed the jury to use the prior injury evidence for the 
prejudicial pujpose, or gave no cautionary instructions. Therefore, the trial prejudice-was 
not remedied by the instructions as the law requires.
When prejudicial evidence is admitted at trial, the court should protect defendant’s
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interests with cautionary instructions informing the jury of the proper use of the evidence.
Sk Caldweil v. Mississippi. 472 U.S. 320 (1985); Dopnclly v. DeChristofcro. 416 U.S. 637 
(1974); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 561 (1967). Allowing a jury to receive prejudicial 
information without providing cautionary instructions limiting the appropriate use of the 
prejudicial information renders the proceeding fundamentally unfair. Caldwell. 472 U.S. 
at 340. In Spencer, the Court held that due process was not violated by prejudicial evidence 
of defendant’s past convictions when the trial court issued cautionary instructions that the 
evidence should only be used for sentencing purposes. Spencer. 385 U.S. at 562-563, 568- 
569. In Donnelly, the trial court gave clear curative instructions referring specifically to 
prejudicial statements made by the prosecutor during closing arguments. Donnelly. 416 U.S. 
at 640 - 641. The Court noted that "the trial court took special pains to correct any 
impression that the jury could consider the prosecutor’s statements as evidence in the case" 
in holding that no due process violation occurred. Donnelly. 416 U.S. at 644.
Without strong curative instructions, prejudicial remarks at trial affect the 
fundamental fairness of the proceedings. Caldwell v. Mississippi. 472 U.S. 320, 340 (1985). 
In Caldwell, the prosecutor made improper statements regarding the role of the jury in 
sentencing the defendant. IsL at 323. Instead of issuing curative instructions, the trial judge 
stated that the prosecutor’s remarks were proper. LL at 329. The Court held the prejudicial 
nature of the prosecutor’s statements rendered the proceedings unreliable. IjL at 341. In 
distinguishingohe case from Donnelly, the Court focused on the trial judge’s failure to4ssue 
strong curative instructions. IjL. at 339.
In the present case, the jury instruction did not caution agmnst improper use of the
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evidence. Instead, the court encouraged the jury to use the prior injuries for identity. A 
reasonable juror would conclude that the instruction allowed the jury to use the prior injury 
evidence to convict Mr. McGuire. The prior injury evidence is suspect exactly because it 
constitutes character evidence which a jury would impermissibly use to judge the defendant.
Rather than cautioning against improper use of the evidence, the instruction encouraged 
improper use.
This defect was not remedied by other instructions. While the trial court instructed 
the jury not to use evidence to establish that Mr. McGuire is of bad character, (R.T. 756- 
757), any cautionary effect was diminished by the contrary instructions allowing the evidence 
to be used to show identity without any testimony linking Mr. McGuire to the injuries.
(R.T. 757). When instructions contradict, a reasonable juror could easily resolve the 
contradiction by choosing to abide by the burden-shifting instruction. Franklin. 471 U.S. at 
322. In the present case, a reasonable juror could have relied on the improper instruction in 
convicting Mr. McGuire.
Even if the jury did not interpret the instructions as permitting prior injury evidence 
to be used for identity, the instructions were not properly cautionary. To be properly 
cautionary, the instructions needed to clearly identify to which evidence they referred. In 
PQPngliy, the cautionary instruction specifically referred to the statement at issue. Donnelly. 
416 U.S. at 644. The instructions in the present case are too ambiguous to be cautionary. 
Regardless of whether the jury believed the instruction referred to prior injury evidence, the 
instructions did not cure the prejudice at trial. In order for the jury instructions to be 
cautionary they should have specifically referred to the prior injury evidence, stating that the
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evidence was allowed in for the limited purpose of showing accident. Instead, the 
instructions magnified the prejudicial nature of the proceedings in violation of due process.
When the evidence relating to decedent^s prior injuries is considered with the
rest of the prweedinps^ the prejudicial effect reaches the level of a due process
violation.
The due process clause of the Constitution is violated when the trial court proceedings 
arc rendered fundamentally unfair. Tumev v. Ohio. 273 U.S. 510 (1927). In
determining whether a trial was fundamentally unfair, the prejudicial statements to the jury 
must be viewed in light of the entire proceeding. Cupp v. Naughten. 414 U.S. 141, 147 
(1973). In Navehtgn, the trial court erroneously instructed the jury as to a presumption of 
truth in witness testimony. IjL. at 142. However, in two other parts of the instruction the 
court stated the burden of proof as being beyond a reasonable doubt. Id* at 142. In 
determining that the erroneous instruction in Naughten did not violate due process the Court 
relied on the fact that the challenged instruction is only part of the whole proceeding. Id* at 
147.
Viewing the entire proceeding of Mr. McGuire’s trial, the prejudicial impact of 
evidence relating to decedent’s prior injuries was extreme. The State’s case was not 
overwhelming. Doctors presented evidence of the infant’s anal tearing and broken ribs.
(R.T. 84, 107). This evidence was unconnected to Mr. McGuire. Yet, as character 
evidence introduced during Mr. McGuire’s trial, the jury would likely use the evidence to 
convict. The jury was then instructed to use the evidence for identity. Reason, practice, and 
American jurisprudence forbid this use of character evidence.
There was no strong evidence in support of Mr. McGuire’s conviction of second
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degree murder presented at trial. The improper instruction encouraged an unsupported 
inference of malice. That there was not overwhelming evidence in support of Mr.
McGuire s conviction increases the likelihood that the conviction is based on the prejudicial 
evidence. Strong evidence supporting the conviction was not presented at trial. To the 
contrary, testimony was given by Mrs. McGuire that she, and not her husband, had struck 
the child. (R.T. 342). Although evidence was presented that Mre. McGuire asked her 
husband at the hospital what had happened to the baby, (R.T. 178), no strong implications 
can be inferred by this statement. When Mrs. McGuire was at the hospital she was most 
hkely distraught, and therefore the jury could conclude that statements made at the time were 
not a good indication of what really happened. If Mrs. McGuire had recenUy hit her child 
and knew the child was near death, the jury could expect that Mrs. McGuire would act 
confused as opposed to admitting she had caused the injuries. Likewise, statements made by 
Mr. McGuire that the child may have received the injuries from falling off the couch are not 
conclusive. (R.T. 209). These statements are consistent with Mr. McGuire being truly 
ignorant as to what had happened to the child.
There was little other evidence in support of Mr. McGuire’s conviction. Testimony 
was presented that Mr. McGuire had been alone with the decedent for a short period of time 
on the day of her death. (R.T. 373). This evidence is weakened by the conflicting evidence 
regarding how long Mr. McGuire was alone with the child. The time sequence was 
measured by vague notions such as the amount of time it took Mrs. McGuire to place her 
phone call (R.T. 337) and the amount of time a neighbor took to get dressed after a shower. 
(R.T. 548). This is the only evidence that placed Mr. McGuire alone with the child on the
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day she died.
In light of the State’s weak case, the importance of the prior injury evidence is 
magnified. The jury is extremely likely to have been influenced by the unconstitutional 
instruction. The jury asked questions during deliberations which focused on issues of burden 
of proof and murder versus homicide. During the two days of deliberation, the jury 
requested the court to reread the instructions regarding reasonable doubt and the elements of 
manslaughter and murder. (R.T. 776, 782). These are areas where the prejudicial nature of 
the prior injury evidence becomes very important.
The entire proceeding of Mr. McGuire’s trial was fundamentally unfair in violation of 
his right to due process of law. Prejudicial evidence was admitted at trial. Improper jury 
instructions reinforced the prejudicial use. Without overwhelming evidence to support Mr. 
McGuire’s conviction of second degree murder, it is more likely the jury was affected by the 
prejudicial evidence. Looking at the totality of the circumstances, Mr. McGuire was 
convicted without due process protections.
While a formal harmless error analysis is unnecessary, the level of prejudice to Mr. 
McGuire reaches the Chapman standard. In determining that the due process violation 
created reversible error, the burden is on the petitioner to show beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the error did not effect the jury’s verdict. Chapman v. California. 386 U.S. 18, 24 
(1967). However, the Chapman standard has already been met in this case. The error must 
have affected^the verdict because (1) the prosecution’s case was not overwhelming, (2)_the 
jury was concerned with the very issues for which the evidence would improperly be used,
(3) the circumstantial use of character evidence shifts the burden of proof, and the
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instructions were not sufficiently cautionary, (4) and the jury instructions alone shifted the 
burden of proof. The error was not harmless. Even if the Court finds it necessary to go 
through the formal harmless error analysis, the prejudicial nature of the proceedings would 
exceed the Chapman standard.
CONCLUSION
When the trial court admitted highly prejudicial evidence of prior injuries, 
unconnected to the defendant, and instructed the jury to use this evidence to convict Mr. 
McGuire, the proceedings were rendered fundamentally unfair. When evidence of prior 
injuries to a child is admitted to establish battered child syndrome, that evidence cannot be 
jsed to prove the identity of the assailant. For the forgoing reasons, it is respectfully
requested that the judgment of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal be affirmed. Dated, 
November 20, 1991.
Respectfully submitted.
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